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Disputes & ADR

Can Judges Directly Refer Barristers for Contempt? Court of Appeal Blocks Rajiv Menon KC Referral

George Daniel 3 min read

A Court of Appeal ruling involving Rajiv Menon KC has drawn a sharp limit around judicial contempt powers after senior judges ruled that a Crown Court judge cannot directly refer a barrister to the High Court for contempt proceedings without involvement from the attorney general.

The decision matters far beyond one criminal trial because it addresses a question many advocates may never have expected to face directly: can judges independently trigger contempt proceedings against barristers over conduct during live courtroom advocacy?

The Court of Appeal’s answer was effectively no.

Menon had faced allegations that he misled a jury and ignored judicial directions during his closing speech at Woolwich Crown Court in a criminal damage case linked to protests at an Elbit Systems factory near Bristol. Although none of the original defendants was convicted, a retrial later resulted in convictions for four defendants, including Menon’s client Charlotte Head.

Following the original trial, the Crown Court attempted to refer the alleged contempt directly to the High Court. But the Court of Appeal has now ruled that the Administrative Court and Divisional Court lacked jurisdiction to consider the allegations without an application from the attorney general.

For criminal barristers, the ruling is likely to be viewed as a significant procedural safeguard.

British barrister walking outside the Royal Courts of Justice after Court of Appeal contempt ruling

The Court of Appeal’s ruling in the Rajiv Menon KC case is likely to intensify debate over judicial contempt powers and protections for courtroom advocacy.

Contempt proceedings are not merely disciplinary disputes. Allegations of contempt can expose advocates to professional sanctions, reputational damage, financial consequences, and potentially imprisonment. The judgment therefore reinforces that courts cannot bypass long-established constitutional procedures even during difficult or politically sensitive trials.

Lord Justice Bean, Lord Justice Dingemans, and Lord Justice Stuart-Smith said the “overwhelming weight of authority” showed there was no direct route allowing a Crown Court judge to refer alleged contempt in the face of the court straight to the High Court.

Instead, the judges said the matter could have been referred to the attorney general, the Bar Standards Board, or another High Court judge sitting as a Crown Court judge if summary action had been necessary.

That procedural distinction could now influence how future courtroom misconduct allegations involving advocates are handled across England and Wales.

The ruling arrives at a time when criminal courts are increasingly dealing with politically charged protest cases, complex advocacy disputes, and growing scrutiny surrounding courtroom conduct. Many barristers are likely to see the judgment as an important reaffirmation that aggressive or controversial advocacy cannot automatically trigger improvised contempt procedures outside established legal routes.

The Court of Appeal stressed that it was not criticising the original trial judge personally and acknowledged the difficulties faced during the proceedings. The judges said there had been “no ideal solution” during the trial itself.

However, they concluded that the Crown Court had no jurisdiction to make a direct referral to the High Court and that the Divisional Court similarly lacked jurisdiction to deal with the matter following that referral.

The judges added that it would have been open to the trial judge to refer the matter either to the attorney general or to the Bar Standards Board as a potential professional conduct issue.

Menon’s solicitor, Jenny Wiltshire of Hickman & Rose, said the attempt to prosecute him for contempt should never have happened.

She described the case as an “unprecedented attempt to criminalise lawyers for doing their job and representing their clients fearlessly”.

For the wider legal profession, the judgment is likely to be interpreted as a reminder that contempt powers — while extensive — remain constrained by procedural and constitutional safeguards designed to protect both judicial authority and the independence of legal advocacy.

The case has now been referred back to the original trial judge.

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