Apple’s dispute with the UK Government over access to encrypted iCloud data has returned to the Investigatory Powers Tribunal, where Apple and civil liberties groups are pursuing separate challenges to the government’s Technical Capability Notice powers and the secrecy surrounding their use.
At a case management hearing on 17 September, Ben Jaffey KC, representing Privacy International and Liberty, argued that the government’s continued “neither confirm nor deny” position had become “farcical” because the reported notice and subsequent developments had already been extensively discussed in public. Apple’s lawyers have separately challenged the secrecy surrounding the proceedings and the powers available to the government under the Investigatory Powers Bill: Security Vs Privacy – Lawyer Monthly.
The litigation concerns Technical Capability Notices, known as TCNs, issued under section 253 of the Investigatory Powers Act. Such notices can require communications providers to maintain technical capabilities enabling lawful access to data, while the statutory regime also imposes strict restrictions on disclosure.
Privacy International’s case, numbered IPT/25/83/CH, is separate from Apple’s proceedings. Privacy International and Liberty, alongside two individual claimants, are challenging aspects of the TCN regime and the secrecy governing its operation.
The dispute developed after reports in 2025 that the Home Office had required Apple to retain the capability to provide access to encrypted iCloud material. Privacy International says the initially reported requirement appeared capable of affecting users outside the UK, while subsequent reporting indicated that a later notice focused on UK users.
Apple Loses to EU Commission on DMA — Lawyer Monthly to the government’s use of TCN powers. Its first proceedings ended following what the tribunal described as a change in circumstances, but the company launched a renewed challenge in 2026. The separate cases are now being managed by the Investigatory Powers Tribunal while following different procedural timetables.
The UK Government has not publicly confirmed the existence or terms of an individual notice. At the September hearing, government lawyer Neil Sheldon argued that moving away from the established neither-confirm-nor-deny approach could create national-security risks by allowing hostile actors to identify which technology companies were subject to surveillance requirements. The tribunal is expected to determine the secrecy issue separately.
Privacy International and Liberty argue that the TCN framework lacks sufficient transparency and safeguards and could undermine the security of encrypted communications. Their case raises broader questions over the extent to which government powers can require Can the UK Force Apple and Google to Block Nude Images on Children’s Phones? to alter products or technical systems to facilitate access to protected information.
Apple has maintained that it will not create a backdoor or master key for its products. The company stopped offering Advanced Data Protection to new UK users after the dispute emerged. Under that system, encryption keys for protected iCloud categories are held only on trusted user devices, meaning Apple itself cannot access the encrypted information.
The proceedings could have wider consequences for technology companies providing end-to-end encrypted services in the UK. The tribunal is being asked to consider how far the Investigatory Powers Act allows secret technical requirements to be imposed on providers and how those powers interact with privacy, data security and open justice.
Privacy International says the substantive hearing in its separate challenge remains listed for December 2026. Apple’s renewed challenge is on a different timetable, with Reuters reporting that a full hearing in that case is unlikely until 2027. The tribunal’s ruling on the government’s neither-confirm-nor-deny position is expected before then.