The U.S. Supreme Court has narrowed the circumstances in which companies can be held liable for the actions of their users, ruling that internet providers are not responsible for copyright infringement simply because they know it is occurring.
In Cox Communications, Inc. v. Sony Music Entertainment, decided March 25, 2026, the Court overturned a $1 billion verdict against Cox, holding that liability requires intent to facilitate infringement, not mere knowledge of unlawful activity.
The decision draws a clear line between providing infrastructure and actively facilitating infringement, with immediate implications for technology platforms, internet service providers, and digital intermediaries.
The Dispute in Brief
Sony Music Entertainment and other copyright owners sued Cox Communications, an internet service provider with approximately six million subscribers, alleging that Cox was responsible for widespread copyright infringement carried out by its users.
The claims were based on notices identifying infringing activity linked to Cox subscriber IP addresses. Sony argued that Cox continued to provide internet access to users associated with repeated infringement, making it contributorily liable.
A jury found Cox liable and awarded $1 billion in statutory damages. The District Court largely upheld the verdict.
On appeal, the Fourth Circuit affirmed contributory liability, holding that providing a service with knowledge of infringement could be sufficient, before the Supreme Court granted review on that issue.
ating infringement, with immediate implications for technology platforms, internet service providers, and digital intermediaries.
What The Court Decided
The Supreme Court reversed the Fourth Circuit’s ruling on contributory liability, holding that Cox is not liable for its users’ copyright infringement.
The Court confirmed that a service provider is contributorily liable only where it intended the service to be used for infringement.
That intent can be established only where the provider actively induces infringement or where the service is designed for that purpose.
Applying that framework, the Court found that Cox neither encouraged infringement nor provided a service tailored to unlawful use.
Providing internet access, even to users associated with infringement, was not sufficient to establish liability. The case was reversed and remanded for further proceedings.
How The Court Got There
The reasoning was grounded in the limits of secondary copyright liability under existing precedent.
The Copyright Act does not expressly impose liability for another party’s infringement, and the judgment emphasises that implied liability should not be expanded beyond recognised categories.
Two established pathways to liability were reaffirmed. First, inducement requires active steps to encourage infringement, such as promoting or marketing a service for unlawful use.
No such conduct was identified here, with Cox shown to have issued warnings, suspended accounts, and taken measures aimed at reducing infringement.
Second, liability may arise where a service is incapable of substantial lawful use. Internet access clearly falls outside this category, given its widespread legitimate applications.
A central point is that knowledge of infringement alone is insufficient. Awareness of unlawful activity—or a failure to prevent it—does not establish the intent required for contributory liability.
Arguments based on the Digital Millennium Copyright Act were also rejected, with the statute framed as providing a defence from liability rather than creating new grounds for it.
The decision signals that secondary liability is unlikely to be expanded beyond established categories without clear congressional direction.
A concurring opinion by Justice Sotomayor, joined by Justice Jackson, agreed with the outcome but criticised the majority for limiting secondary liability to two categories.
It suggested that other common-law theories, including aiding and abetting, may still apply in appropriate cases.
Even so, the concurrence agreed that liability could not be established on the facts, as the evidence did not demonstrate the intent required to facilitate infringement.
Key Takeaways For Business
- Knowledge alone does not create liability
- Intent is now the central legal threshold
- Notice-and-response systems do not determine liability
- Claims must focus on proving intent, not awareness of infringement
What Happens Next
The case is remanded for further proceedings consistent with the Supreme Court’s ruling, requiring the lower courts to reassess the claim without the contributory liability theory previously upheld.
Case Details
- Court: Supreme Court of the United States
- Date: March 25, 2026
- Case: Cox Communications, Inc. v. Sony Music Entertainment
- Docket: No. 24–171
- Area of law: Intellectual property / copyright / litigation procedure
- Result: Fourth Circuit reversed and remanded
People Also Ask
Can an ISP be liable if it knows users are pirating content?
No. The Supreme Court held that knowledge alone is not enough to establish liability. A provider must intend for its service to be used for infringement, which requires evidence of inducement or a service designed for unlawful use.
What is contributory copyright infringement?
Contributory copyright infringement is a form of secondary liability where a party can be held responsible for another’s infringement if it intentionally facilitates or supports that conduct. It requires proof of intent, not just awareness.
Did the Supreme Court eliminate platform liability for copyright infringement?
No. The Court did not eliminate liability but clarified its limits. Platforms may still be liable where they actively encourage infringement or provide services specifically designed for that purpose.
How does the DMCA safe harbour affect liability?
The Digital Millennium Copyright Act provides a defence that can protect service providers from liability in certain circumstances. However, it does not create liability, and failure to qualify for safe harbour does not automatically make a provider liable.
What must plaintiffs prove after Cox v. Sony?
Plaintiffs must prove that the provider intended to facilitate infringement. This can be shown through inducement or by demonstrating that the service is tailored to infringing activity, rather than through knowledge alone.